Judicial Draftmanship by Beardsley, Charles A.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 2 
5-1-1949 
Judicial Draftmanship 
Charles A. Beardsley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles A. Beardsley, Address, Judicial Draftmanship, 24 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 146 (1949). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol24/iss2/5 
This Address is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
JUDICIAL DRAFTSMANSHIP*
CHARLE S A. BEARDSLEY"
N INE YEARS AGO, when I was president of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, I said out loud what members of the bar had long been
whispering throughout the country-I said that the judges of our
appellate courts were casting an all but unbearable financial burden
upon the lawyers, by steadily and unnecessarily increasing the length
of their opinions-printed copies of which opinions the lawyers must
buy and store, if they are to continue to practice law I did not then
refer to any specific opinion, but I did point out that, on the average,
the opinions are about six times as long as they were a century ago,
and that, year by year, they are getting longer and longer.
I understand that this session of this section on Judicial Adinnistra-
tion is devoted to a consideration of the question as to whether any-
thing should and can be done about it. I vote "aye" on the "should,"
and I vote "aye" on the "can."
I take it that the invitation extended to me to speak to you is in the
nature of a request, if not a challenge, to explain, and if possible to
justify, my vote on these two questions. In responding to tlus request-
m meeting this challenge-necessarily, I shall be critical of your
opinions. Nothing that I shall say, however, should be construed as
indicative of disrespect. I shall try to make the criticism constructive.
I hope it will not hurt. If it does, permit me to remind you that you
have asked for it.
It has occurred to me that, on this occasion, instead of talking exclu-
sively about opinions generally, I had better talk about some specific
opinions-as illustrative of opinions generally As illustrative of the
brief opinions of a century ago, I refer you to the opinion of the
Supreme Court of California in a case I recently had occasion to cite
-Robznson v. Pioche, 5 Cal. 46o. Robinson fell into a hole in the side-
walk in front of Pioche's store. When he sued Pioche for damages for
his injuries, the evidence showed that, at the time of the fall, he was
drunk. The trial court instructed the jury that, if his drunkenness con-
* An address delivered before the section on Judicial Administration, American Bar
Association meeting, Seattle, September 6, 1948.
t Member of the Oakland, California, bar. President, American Bar Association.
1939-1940.
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tributed to his injuries, he could not recover. He didn't. He appealed.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of California, by Mr. Justice
Heydenfeldt, was only six lines long, as follows:
The Court below erred in giving the turd, fourth and fifth instructions.
If the defendants were at fault in leaving an uncovered hole in the sidewalk
of a public street, the intoxication of the plaintiff cannot excuse such gross
negligence. A drunken man is as much entitled to a safe street, as a sober
one, and much more in need of it.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Refreshing, isn't it?
I was somewhat uncertain as to where I should look for an example
of a present day opinion-one to lay along side this six-line California
Supreme Court opinion of a century ago. I rejected the idea of using
one of the recent opinions of the Supreme Court of California. I
wasn't sure that any of the judges of that court would be here to de-
fend themselves. And, besides and more important, my law firm prac-
tices regularly before that court; and I did not desire to cause any
undue resentment that might work to the disadvantage of a client. The
Supreme Court of Washington seemed to be the best prospect. Not
only was it extremely unlikely that I shall ever have occasion to prac-
tice before that court, but also it was the court that was most likely to
be well represented at this meeting-the court that was most likely to
have judges here who could defend themselves, if it should appear to
them that any defense is available.
But what opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington? In order
to avoid the possible temptation to search for the most horrible ex-
ample of a present day opinion, I decided to select it by chance-to
take the last opinion of that court in the last Pacific Reporter advance
sheet-whatever that opinion might be.
I took the then last advance sheet off the shelf-this was as of about
two months ago-I hadn't looked inside the cover before-and I found
that the last Washington case there reported was Thilman v. Thilman,
193 P.(2d) 674.
The opinion is seventeen printed pages long as compared with the
six line opinion in Robnson v. Piocke. I searched for the reason for
its great length. I found that there was no substantial conflict in the
evidence. I also found that the case involved very few questions of
law-the industrious editorial staff of the West Publishing Company
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could find in the seventeen pages material for only four paragraphs
of syllabus.
What were these four legal questions, the decision as to which re-
quired seventeen printed pages? Were they new, doubtful, or difficult?
No.
Here they are:
i. The opinion of the trial judge, as to the competency of one whom
he saw and heard testify, is entitled to great weight.
2. The evidence sustained the trial judge's finding of competency,
there being no evidence of incompetency
3. The evidence sustained the trial judge's finding that there was no
undue influence, there being no evidence of undue influence.
4. A granted farm land to B, subject to A's life estate, in considera-
tion of B's agreement to operate the farm, so long as he was physically
able to do so, during A's lifetime; B's death in A's lifetime did not
result in a partial failure of consideration, since the agreement expressly
provided that it should not so result.
I have studied the seventeen-page opinion carefully-I have read
it at least a half dozen times. And I found no other legal point decided
therein-only these four simple and self-evident legal points.
Seventeen printed pages! Why is it so long? There are several
reasons. One reason is that the opinion cites, and quotes extensively
from, the authorities in support of these self-evident legal propositions.
Another reason is that the opinion sets forth several legal descriptions
of tracts of country lands-none of which descriptions has anything
to do with the decision in the case. Another reason is that the opinion
quotes in full numerous pieces of documentary evidence, none of
which, except a half dozen lines of one of them, has any pertinency
whatever. And, primarily, the great length is due to the detailed family
history--the family history of the Thilman family
I have taken the liberty of rewriting the opinion in Thilnan v.
Ttilman.$ I believe that the rewritten opinion adequately serves every
purpose that could be served by an appellate court opinion in that case.
I would be glad if all of you who are interested in this problem
would compare it with the seventeen page opinion in 193 P.(2d) 674.
I doubt if any of you will feel that anything has been omitted that is
necessary, or even useful.
This rewritten opinion is shorter. Its length is slightly less than 4
t Mr. Beardsley's rewritten opinion appears at the end of this article.
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per cent of the length of the origmal-the original more than twenty-
five times as long as the revision I
It is because of such things as this that, nine years ago, I raised the
issue as to the cost to the American lawyers of buying and storing
printed copies of unnecessarily long opinions.
Serious as is the problem presented by this cost, it is only a part,
and probably a comparatively small part, of the problem.
It would be well for us to consider the waste of time-waste of time
of the legal profession, present and future-resulting from these long
opimons-the waste of time incident to court opinions that are
twenty-five times longer than necessary, as is this opinion in Thilman
v. Thilman. This waste is apparent from many angles. First, there is
the waste of time of the draftsman-the time spent in drafting a
twenty-five unit opinion, when a one unit opinion would serve all
useful purposes. Second, there is the waste of time of the other judges
on the same court, who must read and comprehend twenty-five units
instead of one unit in order to decide whether to concur or to dissent.
Third, there is the waste of time of the editorial staff of the law pub-
lishers who must read the twenty-five units in search of syllabus and
digest material. And, finally, and of the most far-reaching importance,
there is the waste of time of every American lawyer, every American
judge, and every American law student, who will ever have occasion
to use that opinion in determining and applying the law as announced
and applied therein. And that waste will continue as long as our
civilization lasts.
It is impossible to measure accurately the cumulative effects of this
waste. In the first instance, as I have observed, there is the waste of
time of the judges of the court that hand down the opinion. There are
nine judges on the Supreme Court of Washington, besides the author
of the opinion, there are eight other judges to read and comprehend
the twenty-five unit opinion, if the court sits in banc, four if in depart-
ment. How many judges of other courts, how many lawyers, and how
many law students will be victims of the waste caused by this twenty-
five unit opinion nobody knows. This much, however, we do know-
tins opinion is supposed to be useful to members of our American
society, as long as our civilization lasts, and every member of that
society, who is served by it, will pay twenty-five times as many units
of time for the service as the service is worth.
The twenty-five to one is a low estimate. Actually, it will cost them
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more than twenty-five units, because a twenty-five unit opinion must
be read several times before it is adequately understood. As I said
before, I read the opinion in Thilman v. Thilman at least a half dozen
times before I was sure I understood it. That raises the ration from
twenty-five to one to one hundred and fifty to one. Maybe, that is too
high as applied to long opinions generally-I don't know So suppose
we leave it at twenty-five to one. That, we may be sure, is the absolute
minimum. That, surely, is bad enough.
Time is mankind's most precious asset. It is limited. It is irreplacable.
When twenty-five units of time are consumed in doing something that
could be better done in one unit, the loss is very, very heavy The
result to society is incomprehensible; it could be fatal.
Yes, I vote "aye" on the proposition that something should be done
about the great length-the obviously unnecessary length-of judicial
opinions.
I now invite your attention to the second part of the question, on
which I also voted "aye"-the question as to whether or not anything
can be done about it.
The first thing that is necessary is for our appellate court judges to
become persuaded that something should be done about it-to stop
trying to brush aside criticism by the observation (which I have heard
on more than one occasion) that there is nothing to it, because "I never
heard a lawyer complain about the court's opinion, if the judgment is
in his favor"-an observation that obviously avoids the issue-an ob-
servation that merely indicates that, in a particular case in which he
appears, the lawyer is more concerned with the judgment of the court
than with its opinion in that particular case-a concern that has
nothing whatever to do with his concern, or with his lack of concern,
with the mass of opinions in cases in which he does not appear-
opinions that he must use in his service to his clients, as long as he
practices law
The judges can write shorter-much shorter-opinions, if they want
to-if they will recognize the need, and apply themselves to meeting
that need.
They can, if they will, leave out of their opinions numerous details
that serve no useful purpose, such, for instance, as the long family
history of the Thilman family
They can announce long-established rules of law without long cita-
tion or quotation of supporting authority, and without long elabora-
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tion. If a judge desires to make the point that two plus two equals
four, it is unnecessary to do it like this: .
If, by the use of that arithmetical formula known as addition, we
desire to arrive at the sum of two added to two, we will find-and we
make this statement boldly, without fear of successful contradiction-
we repeat, by the use of that arithmetical formula hereinbefore men-
tioned, we shall find-and we take full responsibility for the statement
we are about to make-that the sum of the given two added to the
other two will be four.
As someone has observed: "Another form of wastefulness is the
expenditure of words beyond the income of ideas."
The judges can also shorten their opinions by curing themselves of
the practice-a cure that many lawyers might also profitably take--
of using several words to express a meaning that is better expressed
in one word. This is a common practice in opinion writing. Thus, in
the opinion in Thilman v. Thilman, I note the following- "last will
and testament," meaning "will", "vacating and setting aside," mean-
mg "vacating", "cancel and set aside," meaning "cancel", "executed
and delivered," meaning "executed", "made and entered into," mean-
mg "made"; "devising and bequeathng," meaning "giving", "named
and appointed," meaning "appointed", and "adjudged and decreed,"
meaning "decreed."
They can also shorten, and otherwise improve, their opinions by
using simple language-words of one syllable in preference to words
of two or more syllables-rn preference to long and little known words
commonly used by lawyers and judges.
I have heard the argument advanced that simple language cannot
properly be used in the law, because law is a "learned science," and
because "the higher level of culture, the less plain and simple the
language." I dissent, and in support of my dissent I quote the follow-
mg authorities:
Longfellow- "In character, in manners, in style, in all things, the
supreme excellence is simplicity"
Emerson: "Nothing is more simple than greatness; indeed, to be
simple, is to be great."
Philip J. Bailey" "Simplicity is Nature's first step, the last of Art."
St. Paul, a truly venerable authority, in his first epistle to the
Corinthians, chapter 14, mnth verse: "So likewise ye, except ye utter
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by the tongue words easy to be understood, how shall it be known
what is spoken? for ye shall speak into the air."
The fact that law is a learned profession is no reason why, when
what we mean is
"Twinkle, twinkle, little star,
How I wonder what you are
Up above the world so high,
Like a diamond in the sky"
we should write or say
"Scintillate, scintillate, globule vivific,
Fain would I fathom thy nature specific
Loftily poised in ether capacious,
Strongly resembling a gem carbonaceous."
Revmon of Seventeen-Page Optozon of the Supreme Court of Washmgton
130 Wash. Dec. 694, 193 P.(2d) 674 (1948)
The plaintiff, Margaret Thilman, deeded certain farm lands to her son,
Francis Thilman. After Francis Thilman's death, this action was brought
to set aside the deed, and contracts relating thereto, and to quiet title to
the farm lands, upon three grounds, (1) Margaret Thilman's alleged in-
competency (2) undue influence, and (3) partial failure of consideration.
The Superior Court decided (1) that Margaret Thilman was competent,
(2) that there was no undue influence, and (3) that there was a partial
failure of consideration, by reason of which the defendant, Myrtle Thilman,
the widow of Francis Thilman, must pay $5,350 to Margaret Thilman.
Judgment was entered accordingly The defendant appealed from the judg-
ment, the plaintiffs cross-appealed. The questions presented for our decision
are the propriety of the Superior Court's decision on these three points.
There was no evidence presented in support of the claims that Margaret
Thilman was incompetent. All pertinent evidence indicated her competency
True, she was seventy-one years old, but, standing alone as it does, this
fact has no tendency to impeach the trial court's finding. Furthermore the
trial court saw and heard her testify, a fact which provides additional sup-
port for its finding of competency
The finding that there was no undue influence is amply supported. In
fact, there is no evidence to the contrary
When Margaret Thilman deeded the farm to her son, she reserved a life
estate in a fifty-two-acre parcel, and required him to work the parcel, she
agreeing to pay him $600 per year. The purported partial failure of con-
sideration, and the consequent requirement of payment of $5,350, are based
on the fact that the son predeceased the mother. But the contract did not
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impose upon the son the unqualified obligation to work the fifty-two acres
as long as the mother lived, but only "so long as he is physically able" to
do so, and it provided that, if during ins mother's lifetime he should die,
or become physically unable to work the farm, the only result would be
that lus $600 per year salary should cease, and that otherwise "this agree-
ment nevertheless m all respects shall remain in full force and effect and be
enforceable by the parties hereto, their heirs," etc. Obviously, therefore,
the son's death did not result in any partial failure of consideration, since
the parties expressly agreed that it should not so result, and the Superior
Court erred in deciding that the son's widow must pay the $5,350.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the superior court
with instructions to dismiss plaintiff's action with prejudice, and to enter
judgment quieting the title of the appellant, Myrtle Thilman, to the real
estate described in the decree, subject only to the life estate of Margaret
Thilman in the fifty-two-acre parcel.
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